The Confusion Surrounding Arizona’s Administrative Agency Appeals Process #1: What Standard Applies Anyway?

When an Arizona agency makes an administrative decision, what is the standard of review on appeal? Recent changes to the statutory scheme for judicial review of administrative decisions make it anything but clear.

With amendments in 2018 and 2021, the Arizona legislature expanded upon the traditional approach for judicial review. In the past, when reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, courts had to grant deference to the agency’s decision. Now, A.R.S. §12-910 prescribes a broad spectrum of judicial review standards.

At one end, subsections (C) and (D) require de novo review of an administrative agency decision. Subsection (C) applies to those agencies exempt from Arizona’s administrative hearing procedural requirements, such as the State Department of Corrections, Arizona Board of Regents, the State Personnel board, and the Board of Tax appeals. Subsection (D) applies to agencies that regulate a profession or occupation, including the licensing of physicians, attorneys, art therapists, acupuncturists, and barbers. On the opposite end, subsection (G) requires courts to grant deference to an agency’s decision—the traditional standard—for A.R.S.§ 20-2530 et seq., which regulates healthcare appeals.

But why are some agencies granted deference while the legislature requires others to have decisions reviewed de novo? It appears the legislature abolished the traditional deference standard to limit the power of administrative agencies, which intimated as investigator, judge, and jury of these cases. See Id. at 23, Brief for the Goldwater Institute as Amicus Curiae, Sync Title Agency, LLC v. Arizona Corporation Commission (No. 1 CA-CV 23-0606) (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024); Glen Staszewski, Four Ways to Deconstruct Regulation and Undermine Democracy in the States, Vol. 66. WM. & MARY L. REV. 1215, 1245 (2025). Specifically, the legislature implemented de novo review for appeals from agencies that regulate professions and occupations because it was argued to be an overreach of agency power to determine who in each profession was allowed to continue on with their livelihood. Jon Riches, Ending Deference to the Administrative State in State Legislatures (2021).

However, subsection (G) conveniently retains the traditional deference standard for healthcare companies. But why? The legislature gave no explicit statement highlighting the reason for carving out this exception, making its existence puzzling. The legislative history, such as it is, offers no clues. Perhaps the healthcare industry lobbyists’ opposition to the new anti-discretionary standard was successful.

Next up: What does a De Novo Administrative Appeal Look Like?